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Article 9

LENDING A HELPING HAND: PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT
FINANCING PROHIBITIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current regulations on professional responsibility allow an attorney to advance his client court costs and expenses of litigation as a
matter of convenience. Attorneys are also allowed to offer their services
on a contingent fee basis;1 this fee arrangement is usually required because an impoverished or disabled client might not otherwise be able to
obtain counsel. 2 Despite these arrangements, other circumstances exist
that could prevent a client from being able to pursue a meritorious
claim without further financial assistance.3 Unfortunately, as the law

I.

A contingent fee contract provides that an attorney's compensation will be a given perBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (5th ed. 1979); See generally F.

centage of the client's recovery.

MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES

18 (1964). For example, an attorney may

contract to receive a fee of 30% of the client's recovery. This fee is said to be contingent on the
outcome because the actual amount of the fee that will be received by the attorney is dependent
on the resolution of the case. Therefore, if the client is awarded $100,000 on his claim, the attorney will receive $30,000 as his fee. If, however, the client does not prevail, the attorney receives no
fee. Id.
2. Contingent fee contracts were established because they often provided "the only practical
means by which one having a claim against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain
the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 2-20 (1980) [hereinafter

MODEL CODE].

However, the regular use of such con-

tracts in most personal injury cases illustrates that contingent fee arrangements are not absolutely
restricted to situations where the clients lack adequate funds to pursue their claims. In fact, the
only two situations in which the use of contingent fees is prohibited are criminal cases and domestic relations cases. Id. DR 5-103(A)(2) (allowing contingent fee arrangements in all civil cases);
DR 2-106(C) (expressly prohibiting contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases); EC 2-20 (dis-

couraging use of contingent fees in domestic relations cases); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (allowing contingent fee arrangements); Id.,
Rule 1.5(d) (expressly prohibiting the use of contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations
and criminal cases) Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules prohibit the use of contingent
fee arrangements in a situation where the client could afford to pay a fixed fee. But, entering into
a contingent fee arrangement in such a situation is expressly discouraged by the Model Code.
MODEL CODE, EC 2-20 ("A lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee ....
").
3. An example of such a situation led to the amendment of Louisiana's rule against attorneys making loans to clients. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 444-47 (La.
1976). In Edwins, an oil worker was severely injured on the job and, as a result of this injury,
incurred extensive hospitalization and treatment expenses. Id. at 444-45. The oil worker then contracted a further illness not related to the accident, but which also required hospitalization and
surgery. Id. at 445. Consequently, these additional medical expenses and his ordinary living expenses, combined with his inability to work, rendered the oil worker impoverished according to the
established poverty level for that year. Id. at 447. Without some means of securing subsistence,
the oil worker would have been "deprived of the only effective means by which he [could] wait out
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now stands, in all but five states" lawyers are "ethically" forbidden'

the necessary delays that result from litigation to enforce his cause of action. He [might have], for
reasons of economic necessity and. physical need, [been] forced to settle his claim for an inadequate amount." Id. at 446.
4. Alabama, California, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Texas are currently the only states
which allow an attorney to either advance or guarantee subsistence loans to clients for necessary
living expenses during pending litigation. See Edwins, 329 So. 2d at 437; ALABAMA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1975); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 5-104(A)(2) (1974); MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B)(2), 52 MINN. STAT. ANN. 21 (West Supp. 1982); State Bar of Texas, Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion 230 (1959). However, it is a principal contention of this
comment that the position of these states represents a new trend which other states will soon
follow.
There are five jurisdictions in which it is unclear whether or not living expense loans would be
allowed. Those jurisdictions are Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Wisconsin, and the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
In Illinois, there are three conflicting cases, none of which has been overruled. In the first
case, People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, the Illinois Supreme Court held that advances for living expenses were permissible as long as repayment was not contingent on the case's
outcome and the loans were not used to solicit business. 341 Il. 578, 578-79, 173 N.E. 827, 831
(1930). The McCallum court stated its belief that, because both the American and State Bar
Associations were not legislative tribunals, their ethical canons were not binding authority and
should only serve as guidelines and possible grounds for disciplinary action. Id. In a 1956 Illinois
ethical opinion, advancement of living expenses was held to be unethical and therefore impermissible. Ill. Opinion 151 (Feb. 6, 1956). Perhaps this decision was influenced by the 1954 American
Bar Association's (ABA) Formal Opinion which also determined that such loans were unethical.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 288 (1954), reprinted in, 41
A.B.A. J. 33 (1955). Finally, in a 1964 opinion, the Illinois Court of Appeals referred back to the
1930 McCallum decision to imply that the ruling which allowed living expense advancements is
App. 2d 138, 154, 198 N.E.2d 142, 150 (1964).
still valid. Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill.
578, 173 N.E.
The court, in People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. McCallum, 341 Ill.
827, a disbarment proceeding, found it ethically permissible for a lawyer holding a contingent fee contract to advance funds to his client for living expenses. In reaching that conclusion, however, it drew a parallel to the permissible advancement of costs and court charges
under Canon 42 of the American Bar Association "with the understanding that the same
are to be ultimately paid by the client."
Id.
This reference was limited to showing that the client must remain ultimately liable for the
advancement of litigation costs and did not resolve the issue of loan advancements.ld.
In Kansas, the conflict arose between a Kansas Supreme Court case which allowed living
expense loans and the subsequent adoption of the ABA Model Rules which would prohibit such
loans. In re Ratner was a disbarment proceeding of two Kansas attorneys for various violations of
the Model Code. 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865 (1965). One charge against the attorneys accused
them of improperly making loans to clients. Id. at 364, 399 P.2d at 868. The charge was based on
the common law crime of maintenance and canons 10 and 42 of the Model Code. Id. at 373-75,
399 P.2d at 874-75. The court specifically held that the attorneys' loan-making activities did not
violate any of these grounds. Id. at 373, 399 P.2d at 874.
[T]he accusers did not contend there would be anything wrong in loaning a client money so
he could live until his case would be tried and could get what he was entitled to rather than
having to settle for much less. But he did state it would be wrong for a lawyer to set up a
scheme and advertise that he would lend money to clients who came to him. We agree with
counsel's last statement. ...
Id.
The Model Rules were not adopted by the ABA until 1983. See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA.
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from providing or guaranteeing subsistence loans or otherwise providing financial assistance which the client may desperately need and can
not independently obtain.

1990 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 82 (1990); ABA Annual Meeting,
69 A.B.A. J. 1365 (1983). Kansas adopted the Model Rules almost two decades after the Kansas
Supreme Court ruling in Ratner. See 2 NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS & PROF. RESP. KS:Rules:1
(Luban ed. 1988). The Model Code was the law at the time of the Ratner decision. KAN. STAT.
ANN.

§ 7-125 (1979) (repealed 1983). In the Model Code, there is some ambiguity which leaves

the issue of living expenses loan-making open to judicial interpretation. According to the Model
Code's ethical considerations, it may be possible for an attorney to make loans to a client. MODEL
CODE EC 5-8. "Although this assistance generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it
is not improper to make loans to a client." Id. The Model Rules, which Kansas later adopted, do
not contain this ambiguity. The Model Rules expressly prohibit the advancement of any financial
assistance to a client except for court costs and the expenses of litigation. See MODEL RULES, Rule
1.8(e). Consequently, there is an unresolved conflict between the Model Rules and the prior Kansas Supreme Court decision in Ratner, thus leaving the status of the current law uncertain.
Missouri and Wisconsin present virtually identical situations to the Kansas situation. Missouri adopted the Model Rules in 1985 and made them effective beginning January 1, 1986.
MISSOURI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(e)(1986). Wisconsin first adopted the Model
Code, but later repealed it and replaced it with the Model Rules on January 1, 1988. In re

Amendment of Supreme Court Rules, 139 Wis. 2d xiii, xv (1988). Like Kansas, both states
adopted the Model Rules subsequent to state supreme court rulings which permitted attorney
loan-making. In re Sizer & Gardener, 306 M. 356, 267 S.W. 922 (1924); Lyttle v. Goldberg, 131
Wis. 613, 111 N.W. 718 (Wis. 1907). However, the Sizer and Lyttle decisions were early 1900s
cases and were decided on the basis of common law principles and not on the basis of the Model
Code or Model Rules. Sizer, 306 Mo. at 374-75, 267 S.W. at 927-28; Lyttle, 131 Wis at -, I ll
N.W. at 721. Nonetheless, since neither case has been overruled or superseded, there is uncertainty in the law of these states. A reasonable review of the present statutory authority enactments
suggests that the prior common law based decisions have been nullified by the subsequent statutory adoption of the Model Rules despite the absence of any official record to that effect.
Finally, the position of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is unresolved with regard to living
expenses loans. The court expressly stated "we need not, and do not, announce a rule for this
Circuit that, standing alone, the conduct involved in Charge No. 8 (the furnishing of living expenses to his clients) would prompt us to discipline Ruffalo. We do not reach that question." In re
Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447, 450 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 544 (1967) (lack of proper
notice violated defendant-attorney's constitutional due process rights).
5. In fact, loaning money to a client for living expenses has been grounds for disbarment.
See, e.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 270, 199 N.E.2d 396, 401,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964). Attorneys have also been sanctioned with suspension for advancing living expenses. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris, 310 Md. 197, 528 A.2d
895 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1062 (1988). But see Florida Bar v. Wooten, 452 So. 2d 547
(Fla. 1984) (appropriate sanction for violation of DR 5-103(B) is public reprimand).
However, several cases which held that attorney loan-making was a punishable violation indicated that extenuating and mitigating circumstances, as well as the seriousness of any co-existing
violations, might also be taken into account when sanctioning attorneys. In re Carroll, 124 Ariz.
80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979) (loan-making for purely humanitarian purposes is mitigating factor); In
re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 589 P.2d 886 (1979) (infrequent loan-making and humanitarian reasons for loan-making are mitigating factors when considering sanctions); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1979); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 563 A.2d 387 (1989) (presence of mitigating
factors and no other serious violations, public reprimand deemed sufficient); In re Berlant, 458 Pa.
439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974) (client's indigence and the necessity of the loan may be mitigating
factors), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
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This comment discusses various justifications advanced for the
general prohibition against an attorney financially supporting his client.
Briefly, those grounds are the ethical prohibitions against (1) an attorney acquiring an interest in the subject matter of his client's cause, (2)
an attorney representing a client in an action in which the attorney has
a conflict of interest, (3) an attorney improperly soliciting a client, and
(4) an attorney stirring up litigation. The anachronistic English common law prohibition against champertous agreements has also been advanced as a historical basis for the rule. This comment also discusses
the validity of those justifications and how the goals would be better
served by a modification of the blanket prohibition.'
Il* BACKGROUND
The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated two series of
ethical regulations designed to govern attorney conduct. The first is a
series of ethical considerations, canons, and disciplinary rules known as
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). The second, adopted shortly after the Model Code,7 is known as the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). These two regulations
are very similar in content. However, they diverge in their treatment of
an attorney's ability to advance funds to his client. The Model Code
requires that the client remain ultimately liable for all funds advanced,' whereas the Model Rules allow repayment of court costs and
litigation expenses to be contingent on the outcome of the litigation.'

6. The discussion in this comment focuses on the national situation, but is also applicable to
the state of Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Model Code on October 5, 1970. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 19 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 217 (Anderson 1982 & Supp.
1991).
7. The Model Code was adopted by the ABA in 1969. Association's House of Delegates
Meets in Dallas, August 11-13, 55 A.B.A. J. 970, 972 (1969). The Model Rules were adopted by
the ABA only fourteen years later in 1983. ABA Annual Meeting, 69 A.B.A. J. 1365 (1983).
There are a variety of theories on why the ABA elected to promulgate a whole new series of rules
so soon after adopting the Model Code. For a discussion of the possible justifications, see Stevens,
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct: A Comparative Analysis, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV.
463, 465 (1988).
8. MODEL CODE, DR 5-103(B).
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may
advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. Model Rule 5, Rule 1.8(e). This Rule provides:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
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Also, the Model Rules permit an attorney to actually pay these costs
and expenses for an indigent client without requiring repayment. 10 Although both regulations contain provisions for advancing litigation expenses, neither allows an attorney to advance funds for the client's private use, such as living expenses.11 This prohibition has been the cause
of much controversy. Currently, five states have amended or modified
their regulations to allow such loans.12
A.

The Historicaland Present Rationales Behind the Prohibition

Prior to the amendment of the Model Code DR 5-103(B) and the
adoption of the Model Rules, courts relied on common law to guide
their determination of when certain financial arrangements between attorneys and their clients were invalid. Before the ABA announced its
position on the matter in Formal Opinion 288 issued in 1954,13 most

courts favored allowing attorneys to loan funds to their clients for living
expenses. 14 Such loans were only prohibited if an attorney offered the
loan as a form of solicitation to induce employment or the attorney
1
made repayment of the loan contingent on the outcome of the suit. '
After the ABA issued Opinion 288, however, many courts held that
loans for any expenses other than those of litigation were invalid."
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses on behalf of
the client.
Id.
10.

Id.

11. DR 5-103(B) says that a lawyer must not "advance or guarantee financial assistance"
while Model Rule 1.8(e) says that a lawyer must not provide "financial assistance." MODEL
CODE, DR 5-103(B); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.8(e). But see MODEL CODE, EC 5-8 (in certain
circumstances, loan-making would not be improper).
12. See sources cited supra note 4.
13. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 288 (1954), reprinted
in 41 A.B.A. J. 33 (1955) [hereinafter Opinion 2881. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text.
14. Strelow, Loans to Clients for Living Expenses, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1419, 1421-23 (1967).
15. See id.; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 IIl. 578, 589-90, 173 N.E.
827, 831 (1930) (living expense advances permitted if client remained ultimately liable for repayment and attorney's motive or intention in making advance was not solicitation of employment);
Johnson v. Great N. Ry., 128 Minn. 365, 369-70, 151 N.W. 125, 127 (1915) (although loaning a
client money to enable continuation of a suit may promote litigation by preventing otherwise financially necessary settlement, such practice not against public policy unless further proof that
loans were made with intent to instigate vexatious and speculative litigation or to serve some
personal motive).
16. The courts did not necessarily rely on the ABA letter, but certainly reached the same
conclusion as the committee did in Opinion 288. El Janny v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 209 F.
Supp. 91 (N.D. Ind. 1962) (refusing to enforce contract for loan repayment); In re Carroll, 124
Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979) (although loan-making for humanitarian purposes is mitigating
factor, such loan-making constitues violation of Model Code DR 5-103); In re Stewart, 121 Ariz.
243, 589 P.2d 886 (1979) (advancement of funds by attorney results in attorney buying an interest in litigation and creates conflict of interest); Florida Bar v. Wooten, 452 So. 2d 547 (Fla.
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Over the years, a number of justifications have been offered as to why
an attorney should be prohibited from financially supporting his client.
Some courts relied on the old common law theory of champerty 17 as a
basis for the proscription. 8 Other courts, as well as the ABA in Opinion 288, based their decisions on the Canons of Professional Ethics
which form the basis for the Model Code and Model Rules. 9
1. Old Common
Maintenance

Law

Crimes

of Barratry,

Champerty,

and

The crimes of barratry, champerty, and maintenance all have
roots in English common law.2 0 Barratry involves the frequent instigation of suits between others or the "inciting of groundless judicial pro-

1984) (mere fact that an attorney advanced money to his client deemed sufficient to prove acquisition of interest in client's litigation); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State
Bar Ass'n v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1979) (relying on Canons 10 and 42 in addition to
DR 5-103 and EC 5-8); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 563 A.2d 387
(1989) (advances for living expenses violate DR 5-103); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris,
310 Md. 197, 528 A.2d 895 (1987) (although funds were advanced for unrelated items, such as
car and video machine, potential existed for future unrelated lawsuit which could affect repayment
of loans; loans thus constituted violation of DR 5-103), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1062 (1988); Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 270, 199 N.E.2d 396, 401, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 931 (1964) (relying on Canons 10 and 42 and Opinion 288); In re Berlant, 458 Pa. 439,
328 A.2d 471 (1974), (relying solely on DR 5-103), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).; see also
cases cited supra note 4 (the conflicting situation in Illinois). But see Strelow, supra note 14, at
1424 ("Two courts have rejected Opinion 288, and two others have ignored it in disciplinary
proceedings in which the Canons were applied").
17. For a definition of champerty, see infra text accompanying note 26.
18. See e.g., Fail v. Gulf States Steel Co., 205 Ala. 148, 87 So. 612 (1920)(contract where
attorney paid client $100.00 and supported her during litigation held void as champertous).
19. See, e.g. In re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1966) (relying on canons 10, 27,
and 42), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 544 (1967). The committee in Opinion 288 relied on
canons 6, 10, 27, and 42. See Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 33. Respectively, those
canons prohibit a lawyer from representing conflicting interests, acquiring an interest in litigation,
improperly soliciting or inducing employment, and agreeing personally to bear the costs of litigation. Id.; MODEL CODE, Canons 6, 10, 27, 42.
Most courts relied on the same reasoning set forth in the canons, although they did not specifically cite to the canons. Most did, at least, rely on the ethical considerations or disciplinary
rules which stemmed from the canons. In Re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.R.D.
485 (D. Md. 1982) (relying on DR 5-103(B), EC 5-1, 5-5, 5-8 and Canon 9); Heinzman v. Fine,
Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 234 S.E.2d 282 (1977) (relying on DR 5-103(B)); In re
Berlant, 458 Pa. 439, 328 A.2d 471 (1974) (relying on DR 5-103(B)), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964
(1975).
20. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, champerty and maintenance laws were
specifically created to prevent the powerful and wealthy feudal lords from interfering in litigation
in which they otherwise had no interest. See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 48, 60-66 (1935). Often, the purpose of their intermeddling was "to oppress the poor, and
rob them of their small inheritances." Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S.E. 557. (1896). The
courts stated that this speculation in litigation by the feudal lords delayed the courts and served to
stir up strife. See, e.g., id. See generally Radin, supra at 60-66.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/9

1990]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT FINANCING PROHIBITIONS

227

ceedings. ' ' 21 Maintenance is a very similar offense. Instead of simply
instigating or encouraging the lawsuit, a maintainer actually becomes
directly involved in the litigation "by maintaining or assisting either
party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it."' 2 2 In actions
based on barratry and maintenance, the barrator or maintainer derives
no personal benefit as opposed to a champertor, who receives a share in
the recovery.2 8 Champerty, the offense most often cited as grounds for
voiding attorney-client contracts for expenses 2 4 is very similar to the
preceding offenses and actually is derived from them.15 Champerty is

21. Annotation, Offense of Barratry; criminal aspects of champerty and maintenance, 139
A.L.R. 620, 621 (1942); Barratry has also been defined as "[tihe offense of frequently exciting or

stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

137 (5th ed.

1979).
22. Key v. Vattier, I Ohio 132, 144 (1823).
23. Id. at 143-44.
24: See Burnes v. Scott, 117 U.S. 582 (1886) (most state courts do not consider champerty
a punishable crime, but rather as grounds to void a contract). For cases discussing champerty as
grounds for voiding a contract, see Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571 (1923) (contract whereby
attorney shared equally in profits of litigation void for champerty); Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624
(1897) (agreement by attorney to undertake litigation on his own account and to receive a portion
of the proceeds found champertous and void); United States ex rel. Payne v. Call 287 F. 520 (5th
Cir. 1923) (agreement by attorney to pay costs considered void for champerty); Sun Life Assur.
Co. of Canada v. Cassanova, 260 F. 449 (1st Cir. 1919) (contract in which attorney received
share of outcome in return for bearing all costs and risks held champertous and invalid); Jones v.
Pettingill, 245 F. 268 (1st Cir. 1917) (attorney's contract found champertous and consequently
unenforceable as against public policy); Northwestern S.S. Co. v. Cochran, 191 F. 146 (9th Cir.
1911) (champerty asserted as grounds for voiding contract between plaintiffs and their attorney);
JBP Holding Corp. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (attorney party to champertous contract precluded from seeking equitable relief to enforce that contract); Brown v.
Bruner, 10 Ohio App. 314 (1919) (contract between attorney and client may be void for champerty and prevent enforcement, but attorney can still pursue action in quantum merit). But see In
re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865 (1965) (maintenance used instead of champerty); Lo
Guidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 128 N.E. 2d 839 (1954) (maintenace used as grounds to
void contract).
25. Champerty is considered to be a more specific form of maintenance. See, e.g., Key v.
Vattier, 1 Ohio 132, 136 (1823) (champerty is "the most odious species of maintenance").
"Champerty is the unlawful maintenance of a suit, in consideration of some bargain to have part
of the thing in dispute, or some profit out of it. Every champerty is maintenance, but every maintenance is not champerty; for champerty is but a species of maintenance, which is the genus."
Brown v. Beauchamp, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon) 413, 416 (1827) (citations omitted). Often, the two
are not distinguished when discussed. The distinction between barratry, maintenance, and champerty is in fact a fine line. Barratry requires frequent or multiple acts. Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App.
61, 185 S.E. 131, affd. 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937) ("Common barratry is the offense of
frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals either at law or otherwise."); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 432 (1831) (barratry requires
minimum of three acts). In maintenance, the maintainor becomes financially involved through
support of the litigation costs. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 859 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
maintainor as "one that maintains or seconds a cause pending in suit between others, either by
disbursing money or otherwise giving assistance"); see also Vattier, I Ohio at 132 (maintenance is
an offense which closely resembles barratry and which involves improperly meddling in a suit
which the meddler neither is involved nor has an interest in the outcome). Finally, the champertor
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essentially an agreement between a non-party and a party to the suit
that, in return for the non-party paying the expenses of the party's suit,
the non-party will receive a portion of the recovery.2
In America, many states enacted statutes prohibiting such actions;
27
other states relied on common law prohibitions. Basically, all three
offenses involve a non-party becoming involved in a lawsuit for the purposes of either stirring up litigation and strife or reaping a personal
benefit.2 8 These offenses were criminalized to prevent the wealthy from
oppressing the poor and to prevent speculators and meddlers from obstructing the administration of justice.2 9 Given these stated purposes, a
malicious or wrongful intent to oppress or interfere with justice is a
necessary element of all three offenses.30

actually bargains for a share of the proceeds. See Quigley v. Thompson, 53 Ind. 317 (1876)
(distinction between champerty and maintenance is existence of an agreement under which intervening party receives part of thing in suit; if meddler does not derive benefit from his involvement,

he is guilty of maintenance, not champerty); see also

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

209 (5th ed.

1979) ( defining champertor as "one who makes or brings suits, or causes them to be moved or
brought, either directly or indirectly, and maintains them at his own cost, upon condition of having a part of the gains or of the land in dispute").
26. Champerty has been defined as "[a] bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by
which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY

209 (5th ed. 1979).

27. For cases applying state criminal statutes prohibiting barratry, see Lucas v. Pico, 55
Cal. 126 (1880); Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131, a.fd, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582
(1937); Bush v. Carbondale, 229 11. 144, 82 N.E. 252 (1907); Curry v. Dahlberg, 341 Mo. 897,
110 S.W.2d 742 (1937); Ex parte McCloskey, 82 Tex. Crim. 531, 199 S.W. 1101, affid, 252 U.S.
107 (1920); Collins v. English, 157 S.W.2d 155 (Tex Civ. App. 1941); Weed v. Foster, 58 Wash.
675, 109 P. 123 (1910). For cases discussing barratry as a common law criminal offense, see
Lucas, 55 Cal. at 126; State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511 (1941); McCloskey, 82 Tex.
Crim. at 531, 199 S.W. at 1101.
For cases discussing maintenance as a statutory misdemeanor, see. Bulkeley v. Bank of Calif.,
68 Cal. 80, 8 P. 643 (1885); Wightman v. Catlin, 113 A.D. 24, 98 N.Y.S. 1071 (1906); Moses v.
McDivitt, 88 N.Y. 62 (1882); VanDewater v. Gear, 21 A.D. 201, 47 N.Y.S. 503 (1897); Stern v.
Indemnity Ins. co., 167 Misc. 446, 4 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1938); Starke v. Wannemacher, 32 N.D. 617,
156 N.W. 494 (1916); Henry v. Neel, 138 Okla. 582, 83 P.2d 819 (1938).
For cases discussing various statutory provisions which make champerty and maintenance
criminal offenses, see Hall v. Jackson, 29 F. 396 (D.C. Cir. 1886); Bulkeley, 68 Cal. at 80, 8 P. at
643; Moses, 88 N.Y. at 62; Stern, 167 Misc. at 446, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 73; Starke, 32 N.D. at 617,
156 N.W. at 494; Henry, 138 Okla. at 582, 83 P.2d at 819. The United States Supreme Court has
said that despite the criminal nature of champerty in most states, both at common law and by
statute, aiding another in pursuit of a lawful action is not considered a punishable crime by most
states. Burnes v. Scott, 117 U.S. 582 (1886). However, most states will consider champertous
contracts to be void. Id.
28. See cases cited supra note 25.
29. Radin, supra note 20, at 72.
30. See, e.g, Vaughan v. Marable, 64 Ala. 60 (1879) (intent to intermeddle for the purpose
of fomenting litigation is a necessary element); see also Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 15 Mass.
226 (1818) (intent or malicious design to oppress or harass is a necessary element).
The offense of barratry specifically does not include actions where the goal of such behavior is

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/9

1990]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT FINANCING PROHIBITIONS

229

Many courts held that an attorney furnishing the expenses of litigation at his own cost or with reimbursement contingent on the outcome constitutes champerty.3 1 With the present day acceptance of contingent fee contracts, this view has obviously changed. Nonetheless,
some scholars assert that the prohibition against an attorney financially
supporting his client or remaining ultimately liable for his client's expenses is a remnant of the old champerty doctrine."2

2. The Canons of Professional Responsibility
A number of the Canons of Professional Responsibility"3 are currently advanced as justifications for the prohibition against an attorney
financially supporting his client.3 4 Basically, the ethical canons and the
disciplinary rules which spring from them are prophylactic in nature.3 5
The disciplinary rules appear to be absolute prohibitions against the
stated conduct. The rules are often, however, designed to prevent more
extreme activities which could result from the prohibited conduct.3 "

to assist in the attainment of justice, but rather only includes those actions which stem from selfish
and cruel motives. See, e.g., State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379 (1830) (justice of peace who
promoted numerous prosecutions in order to exact fees for dismissing them could be indicted for
barratry).
Actions for champerty and maintenance also require a wrongful intent which has to be specifically proven. See cases cited supra note 27.
31. Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Casanova, 260 F. 449, 453-54 (1st Cir. Puerto Rico 1919);
Warder v. Newburgh, 40 App. D.C. 385, 391 (1913); Taylor v. Hinton, 66 Ga. 743, 745 (1881);
Geer v. Frank, 179 Ill. 570, 575, 53 N.E. 965, 966 (1899); Thompson v. Reynolds, 73 Ill. 11, 13
(1874); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Johnson, 29 Kan. 157, 163 (1883); Million v. Ohnsorg, 10
Mo. App. 432, 434 (1881); In re Gilman, 251 N.Y. 265, 167 N.E. 437 (1929); Stark County v.
Mischel, 42 N.D. 332, 173 N.W. 817 (1919); Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (1823); Martin v.
Clarke, 8 R.I. 389 (1866); Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Wis. 170, 56 N.W. 637 (1893).
32. See Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and Class Actions,
36 Bus. LAW. 1667 (1981); Note, Guaranteeing Loans to Clients Under Minnesota's Code of
Professional Responsibility, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1091, 1093-94 (1982).
33.
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards
of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the
legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which
the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
MODEL CODE, Preliminary Statement.
34. See supra note 19. Canons 5, 28, and 29, which have also been relied on, require a
lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, forbid an attorney to
stir up litigation, and require an attorney to uphold the honor of the profession. MODEL CODE
Canons 5-6, 10, 12, 27, 29, 42.
35. MODEL CODE, Preliminary Statement. "The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
36. For example, Canon 5 prohibits an attorney from representing a client in a suit in which
he has a conflict of interest. MODEL CODE Canon 5. Preventing such representation is not the real
goal of the proscription since some suits may be maintained after full disclosure of the conflict to
the client. The real grounds for the prohibition are preventing possible interference with profes-
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The Opinion 288, Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B), and Model Rule 1.8(e)

prohibitions against an attorney providing a client with financial support are aimed at preventing more extreme activities. This is apparent
through examination of the canons37 asserted as grounds for the prophylactic proscription.
ABA Formal Opinion 28888 held that an attorney who advances or
guarantees the living expenses of a client while a suit is pending violates Canons 6, 10, 27, and 42." In addition, Canons 5, 28, and 29
have been asserted in defending the prohibition against subsistence
loans. 0
a.

Canon 5: Independent Judgment

Canon 5 mandates that an attorney exercise independent professional judgment on his client's behalf.' 1 The related ethical considerasional judgment and abuse of the attorney-client relationship. "[T]he basic purpose behind DR 5103(B) is to prevent the attorney from acquiring a financial interest in the litigation which might
interfere with his/her exercise of independent judgment." In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust
Litigation, 93 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D. Md. 1982). It is believed that an attorney who has a conflicting interest in the litigation will be unable to objectively exercise his professional judgment. Id.
("[T]he basic purpose . . . is to prevent the attorney from acquiring a financial interest in the
litigation which might interfere with his/her exercise of independent professional judgment, especially when it comes to deciding whether to settle the case."); see MODEL CODE, EC 5-1, 5-7, 5-8;
Brame v. Ray Bill's Finance Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
Further, it is possible that the attorney will use his superior knowledge and strong influence to
take advantage of his client. For example, an attorney might actually take advantage of his client's current state of need and suggest loan terms which would be grossly unfair to the client.
37. The reasons for the Model Rules' prohibition are the same as those provided by the
Model Code Canons. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 507 (West 1986).
The basic concern of
Both prohibit a lawyer from supporting a client's living costs . ...
has a personal economic
both is with the conflict of interest created when a lawyer .
interest in the outcome that is created by the hope of repayment of advances for the client's
benefit. That is probably what courts have in mind when they refer generally to a policy
against a lawyer's acquiring an interest in a litigated matter by advancing costs. Both rules
are also transparently concerned with the risk that the promise of money advances could be
employed by some lawyers to solicit clients.
Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, to avoid redundancy of discussion, the remainder of this comment will refer to the reasoning against attorney loan-making in the context of the canons.
38. Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 33.
39. Id., 41 A.B.A. J. at 38.
40. MODEL CODE, DR 5-103(B). Not all courts directly cite the ethical canons, but they do
employ the same reasoning contained in the canons. The Illinois Supreme Court used similar
reasoning concerning the stirring up of litigation as stated in Canon 28, but did not directly cite
the canon. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. McCallum, 341 I11.578, 589, 173 N.E. 827, 831
(1930) (despite "litigation stirring" concern, court permitted living expense advances). "The practice of advancing money to the injured client with which to pay living expenses . . . may in a
Id.
I..."Canon 29 is most often raised in. relation to the canon
sense tend to foment litigation .
27 solicitation concerns. See Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects
of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General
Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 465-69 (1988).

41.

MODEL CODE.

Canon 5.
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tions 42 indicate that an attorney must be completely loyal to his client
and that his judgment on behalf of that client should be exercised
solely for the client's benefit. 8 The attorney cannot allow his personal
interests or the interests of others to prejudice his judgment." Presumably, if an attorney allows himself to acquire a financial interest in the
outcome of the litigation by loaning money to the client, his otherwise
45
objective professional judgment may become tainted.
b. Canon 6: Conflict of Interest
Canon 6 requires that an attorney represent his client competently,
therefore precluding an attorney from representing a client in any
cause in which the attorney has a conflicting interest."' The ABA committee suggested in Opinion 288 that, by loaning funds for living expenses to his client, an attorney would
acquire an additional stake in the outcome of the suit which might lead

him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, and to
accept a settlement which might satisfy his own interest in the verdict
but not advance the interest of his client to the maximum degree. 47
42. The ethical considerations provide the underlying reasons for the standards of professional conduct and serve to guide attorneys in applying the canons and disciplinary rules. See
MODEL CODE, Preliminary Statement, at note 7.

"The Ethical Considerations are-aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations." Id.
43. MODEL CODE, EC 5-1.
44.

Id.

45. "[T]he rule is intended to prevent an attorney's procuring an interest in a legal matter
by the advancements of money or the like." Commission on Prof. Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State
Bar Ass'n v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1979). "[T]he basic purpose behind DR 5103(B) is to prevent the attorney from acquiring a financial interest in the litigation which might
interfere with his/her exercise of independent professional judgment, especially when it.
comes to
deciding whether to settle the case." In Re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.R.D.
485, 490 (D. Md. 1982).
Acquisition by a lawyer of a proprietary interest in a cause of action he is conducting for a
client is expressly prohibited by DR 5-103(A), because if an attorney acquires an interest
in the outcome of a suit in addition to his fees, it can lead to the attorney placing his own
recovery ahead of his client. For example, he might urge a settlement which would be to
his best interest but not to the best interest of the client.
In re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 245, 589 P.2d 886, 888 (1979).
46. MODEL CODE, Canon 6. Hereinafter, this justification for not allowing loans shall be
referred to as the conflict of interest rationale.
47.

Opinion 288, supra note 13, at 38; see also Mid-Atlantic Toyota, 93 F.R.D. 490; Stew-

art. 121 Ariz. at 245, 589 P.2d at 888; Bitter, 279 N.W.2d at 523.
For example, an attorney's interests might oppose those of his client if the attorney loaned his
client money for living expenses, repayment of which would, explicitly or by necessity, be contingent on the outcome. Assume the attorney loaned his client $20,000 and has incurred costs of
$5,000. Assume that payment of the attorney's fees would be 20% of the final recovery. If the suit
proceeds to trial, the attorney estimates that the most his client can expect to recover is $30,000
and the attorney will incur additional costs of $5,000.
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Advancement of the attorney's own interest over that of his client necessarily breaches the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his
client. A further risk exists that the attorney will actually take advantage of that relationship and the implicit element of trust that it entails. The attorney could use his superior knowledge and ability to influence and induce the client to make litigation decisions that would
8
actually be contrary to the client's best interests."
c.

Canon 10: Acquisition of Interest

Subsistence loans are also deemed to violate Canon 10 which prohibits an attorney from acquiring an interest in the subject matter of
his client's litigation."9 Essentially, this theory assumes that repayment
of such loans is fully dependent on the outcome of the litigation regardless of whether the terms of the loan provide otherwise. Therefore, the
attorney is substantively acquiring an interest in the litigation recovery.50 This acquisition of interest would establish a conflict of interest
At this point in the litigation, the opposing counsel offers to settle for $25,000. The attorney
might be inclined to recommend that the client accept the settlement offer since it would be in the
attorney's best interests for the client to settle. Accepting the settlement offer would entitle the
attorney to full repayment of his loan and reimbursement for his $5,000 costs without the additional $5,000 in costs and work hours of preparing for and prosecuting the suit. Twenty percent of
the $25,000 settlement equals $5,500 which leaves the client with a recovery of $19,500. Given
that repayment of the loan is contingent on the outcome, the client would only be required to pay.
$19,500. However, the $19,500 plus the excess $500 in fees over the costs incurred by the attorney
would permit the attorney to break even on his investment. The attorney could then redirect his
efforts toward "greener pastures." Meanwhile the client recovers nothing.
By contrast, assume the suit proceeds to trial and the client in fact recovers $30,000, the
overall outcome would be quite different. The attorney would receive his 20% of the recovery,
$6,000, and the $20,000 loan would be fully repaid. However, given the original costs of $5,000
plus the additional trial costs incurred of $5,000, the attorney would experience a net loss of
$4,000. The client, meanwhile, would receive a net profit of $4,000. The client's recovery after
subtraction of the attorney's percentage would be $24,000. After subtracting the loan repayment
of'$20,000, the client is left with an overall recovery of $4,000. Naturally, it would be in the
client's best interests to proceed to trial. Under the circumstances, he has nothing to lose and
$4,000 to gain.
48. For example, an attorney might actually take advantage of the client's current state of
need and suggest subsistence loan terms which are grossly unfair to the client. The loan proceeds
would essentially serve as additional compensation for the attorney.
49. MODEL CODE, Canon 10. Hereinafter, this theory will be referred to as the acquisition
of interest rationale.
50.
[WJhen a lawyer advances living costs to a disabled client, it is similar to making an advance on account of a prospective verdict. "It is obvious that where the advancement of
legal expenses is made . . . to enable a disabled client and his family to survive, any agreement by the disabled client to repay them would not have the effect of providing the attorney with any reasonable source of repayment other than the proceeds received on trial or
settlement of his client's claims. In effect. the attorney has purchased an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation that he is conducting."
In re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 244-45, 589 P.2d 886, 887-88 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting
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which could seriously impede the attorney's exercise of objective and
independent professional judgment.
In addition to this risk of conflict of interest, four other dangers
may arise when an attorney acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the litigation.5 First, such a personal interest could result in overzealous representation by the attorney which exceeds the scope of acceptable advocacy. Second, the attorney may use his influence and superior knowledge to.obtain unfair terms in a loan to the client. The
third possible danger is the potential effect this interest may have on
the client's decision-making process. Not only could it affect the client's
cost-benefit analysis, 2 but, more importantly, the client might feel a
certain degree of obligation to the attorney as a result of the indebtedness.53 Finally, the attorney might be inclined to make decisions based
on his own judgment without consulting the client. Traditionally, all
decisions affecting a client's rights are to be made by the client." The
rationale behind this rule is that the litigation is instituted to further
the rights and interests of the client, not the attorney. 5' Therefore, the
client's values and opinions should govern all decisions affecting the cli-

Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 265, 199 N.E.2d 396, 398, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964)).
51. Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 465-69.
52. Id. at 468 ("Whenever the potential plaintiff does not bear all the costs and reap all the
benefits of the suit ... there is a significant danger that the decision will not be the most efficient
one.").
For example, if an attorney has an hourly fee contract with his client, he will be indifferent to
client's decision whether or not to pursue a suit in which the chances of recovery look slim. But if
the attorney has a contingent fee contract and the chances of recovery look dismal, he will be very
inclined to settle the suit. The client, on the other hand, might wish to pursue the suit since he
owes the attorney nothing if he loses. Id.
53. "For example, a client receiving financial assistance for living expenses from the attorney might be reluctant to discharge the attorney or to accept a settlement offer which the attorney
thinks is inadequate because the client might feel psychologically and morally indebted to the
attorney." Note, supra note 32, at 1108 (footnotes omitted).
54. MODEL CODE, EC 7-7 ("[T~he authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the
client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.");
MODEL RULES. Rule 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to
be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of
a matter."); see also Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 466.
An attorney is permitted to make certain decisions based purely on his own judgment with
regard to matters such as trial tactics. MODEL CODE, DR 7-l0l(B)(l) ("In his representation of a
client, a lawyer may: (1)Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert a right or position of his client"); MODEL CODE. EC 7-7 ("In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a
lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own.").
55. See MODEL CODE, EC 7-1 note 2 ("[The attorney's] own notions of policy, and his
personal view of what the law should be, are irrelevant. The job entrusted to him by his client is to
use all his learning and ability to protect his client's rights.
...
).
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ent's rights. 6 Even if the attorney and client share the same interests in
the outcome, such as in a contingent fee arrangement where both are
seeking to maximize the final recovery, their opinions and values may
be quite 7different in what they are willing to do to obtain that
5

recovery.
d.

Canon 27: Solicitation

Attorney loan-making could also influence a client's decision-making process in the initial selection of an attorney. If the loan-making
practice of an attorney is publicized or becomes public knowledge, pro58
spective clients may be improperly induced to employ that attorney.
Canon 27 prohibits an attorney from soliciting employment by any
means which could influence a client to employ him as opposed to another attorney. 59 The ABA Formal Opinion 288 stated that publication
of an attorney's custom of making loans to clients constitutes an im60
proper inducement for employment. Publication of such a practice
may be completely inadvertent and occur without any formal advertising.6 1 The Opinion 288 committee implicitly held that publication of an
attorney's willingness to perform legal services is an acceptable form of
6
solicitation, but publication of loan-making is improper. There are
two plausible rationales behind such a rule. First, allowing attorneys to
offer loans to prospective clients as a part of the package for selecting
the attorney would give a distinct advantage to the wealthier attorneys
and firms. 68 Second, decisions concerning which attorney to employ
56. Id.; see Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 466.
57. See Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 466.
58. See In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 86, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (1979). The court stated:
[wie are compelled to point out that the practice of making advances to clients, if publicized, would constitute an improper inducement for clients to employ an attorney.... It is
obvious that as between a lawyer who offers such an agreement and a lawyer who does not,
the client will choose the lawyer who offers financial obligation, regardless of the skill of
the lawyers involved, and regardless of the other factors to be considered in the employment of legal counsel.
Id.; In re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 245, 589 P.2d 886, 888 (1979) ("Moreover, the practice of
making loans to clients, if publicized, would constitute an improper inducement for client to employ an attorney."); see also Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 38.
59. MODEL CODE, Canon 27.
60. See Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 38.
61. It is a well-known fact that one of the best and most effective advertising techniques is
by word of mouth. P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONTROL 602 (6th ed. 1988) ("Many professionals find that a substantial number of
their new clients come to them through word of mouth.").
62. Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 38.
63. See. e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 281, 563 A.2d 387, 390
(1989) ("An important public policy interest is to avoid unfair competition among lawyers on the
basis of their expenditures to clients. Clients should not be influenced to seek representation based
on the ease with which monies can be obtained, in the form of advancements, from certain law
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would no longer be based purely on the attorney's skill or compatibility
with the client's needs, but rather on the best available financing plan.
e.

Canon 28: Stirring Up Litigation

Solicitation coupled with loan-making could have the effect of encouraging an individual to bring suit when he may not have otherwise
done so. Canon 28 strictly prohibits stirring up litigation and cautions
that such behavior may not only result in disbarment, but also in criminal indictment." An attorney's offer to advance the expenses of litigation, make payment of his fees contingent on the outcome, and financially support the client throughout the litigation is practically "an
offer you can't refuse." Consequently, there is concern that suits, which
otherwise would not be brought, will be stirred up by the practice of
attorneys making loans.
f.

Canon 29: Honor of the Profession

Members of the bar usually consider solicitation activities to be
contrary to the honor of the profession because solicitation may involve
the appearance of impropriety and detract from the image of professionalism. 5 It is assumed that aggressive attorneys who engage in solicitation activities may be inclined to misrepresent the probability of prevailing6" and therefore might further use the offer of loans to induce
clients to bring suit.
g.

Canon 42: Advancement of Expenses Limitation

The final justification for the prohibition against attorneys providing financial support to their clients is that such loans violate Canon
42. Canon 42 states that the attorney may advance the expenses of
litigation, subject to reimbursement, as a matter of convenience.6" ABA
Formal Opinion 288 stated that Canon 42 strictly limits attorney advances to ordinary expenses incurred in litigation.6 Since advances for
a client's subsistence are not ordinary expenses of litigation, an attorney is implicitly prohibited from advancing them.6 9

firms or attorneys.").
64. MODEL CODE, Canon 28 ("Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional,
but it is indictable at common law."). For a discussion of the common law crimes under which an
attorney could be indicted, see discussion of the common law crimes of barratry, maintenance, and
champerty, supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
65. Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 453.
66. id.

67.

MODEL CODE,

68.
69.

See Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J.at 33.
Id.

Canon 42.
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The Rationale Behind the Modifications in Five States

Despite numerous justifications for prohibiting attorney loans, five
states elected to modify the prohibition against an attorney providing
70
loans to support a client during litigation. Alabama, California, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Texas currently allow an attorney to either advance or guarantee subsistence loans to clients for necessary living expenses while litigation is pending.71
Thus, all five states recognize that the need for such loans under

70. The original Model Code DR 5-103(B) read as follows:
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a.
lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of
investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
MODEL CODE, DR 5-103(B) (1980).
71. Alabama and California do not explicitly limit what is considered to be a permissible
advance. Alabama permits loans for "emergency" financial assistance, but does not provide any
guidelines for what constitutes emergency assistance. Alabama revised its code to read as follows:
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer may advance or guarantee emergency financial assistance to his client, provided
that the client remains ultimately liable for such assistance without regard to the outcome
of the litigation and, further provided, that no promise of such financial assistance was
made to the client by the lawyer, or by another in his behalf, prior to the employment of
that lawyer by that client.
ALABAMA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1975). California apparently
allows loans for any purpose. California revised its rules to read as follows:
(A) A member of the State Bar shall not directly or indirectly pay or agree to pay, guarantee, or represent or sanction the representation that he will pay personal or business expenses incurred by or for a client, prospective or existing and shall not prior to his employment enter into any discussion or other communication with a prospective client regarding
any such payments or agreements to pay; provided this rule shall not prohibit a member:
(2) after he has been employed, from lending money to his client upon the client's promise
in writing to repay such loan
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Rule 5-104(A)(2) (1974).

Louisiana, Texas and Minnesota limit the advances to the client's living expenses. Louisiana
and Texas modified the rule to allow loans for living expenses under the conditions that the client
remain ultimately liable for repayment, the advances can not be used by the attorney to procure
employment, the offer to advance funds can not be made prior to commencement of the employment relation, and the attorney can not encourage public knowledge of his practice to the extent
that he would be considered to have improperly solicited clients. Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976); State Bar of Texas, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal
Opinion 230 (1959). Minnesota revised its code to read as follows:
[a] lawyer may guarantee a loan reasonably needed to enable the client to withstand delay
in litigation that would otherwise put substantial pressure on the client to settle a case
because of financial hardship rather than on the merits, provided the client remains ultimately liable for repayment of the loan without regard to the outcome of the litigation and,
further provided, that no promise of such financial assistance was made to the client by the
lawyer, or by another in his behalf, prior to the employment of that lawyer by that client.
MINN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(West Supp. f982).

DR 5-103(B)(20), 52
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certain circumstances outweighs the concerns forming the basis for the
general prohibition .l The basic rationale is that these loans might provide the only means by which a client can afford to pursue an otherwise
meritorious claim.7 a However, these states also realize the significance
of the considerations advanced in support of the prohibition and therefore place certain restrictions on attorney loan-making practices. For
example, in order to alleviate concerns that an attorney would acquire
an interest in the litigation as a result of the loan, all five states require
that the client remain ultimately liable for repayment of the loan regardless of the outcome of the litigation. 7" This requirement removes
the danger that an attorney's independent and objective judgment on
behalf of his client may be tainted by a conflict of interest. Since the
attorney is reimbursed for the loan regardless of outcome, any concern
about repayment influencing his judgment no longer exists.
Second, to remove concerns of solicitation and impropriety, all five
states prohibit the use of loans as an inducement to obtain employment.7 5 These states further mandate that no offers for subsistence
loans be made prior to the client contacting the attorney.7 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of the Present Rationales Behind the Prohibition
Against Subsistence Loans

Three of the rationales behind the prohibition are closely interrelated. The reason why an attorney's loan to a client may violate the
Canon 5 requirement for the exercise of independent judgment is because the attorney's interest in securing repayment of those funds could
result in the attorney constructively obtaining an interest in the outcome of the litigation. This violates Canon 10 which prohibits attorneys
from acquiring an interest in their client's litigation. Further, this acquisition of an interest is prohibited because it could result in a Canon
6 conflict of interest which would impede the attorney's Canon 5 independent judgment. Consideration of independent judgment, acquisition
of interest and conflict of interest can be examined together because
they are so closely related. For similar reasoning, the concerns regarding the Canon 29 honor of the profession will be examined in light of
72. In Minnesota, it was further reasoned that there is no substantial difference between the
acquisition/conflict of interest involved in permissible expense loans, contingent fee contracts, and
living expense loans. Therefore, the arbitrary distinction which permits loans in the first two situations but does not in the third should be abolished. Note, supra note 32 at 1092.
73. See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
74. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
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their relationship to the Canon 27 prohibition against solicitation and
the Canon 28 prohibition against stirring up litigation.
1. Conflict of Interest (Canons 5, 6, and 10)
The most frequently stated, and perhaps most influential, rationale
for the prohibition against an attorney providing financial support loans
to his client is that the loan could result in a conflict of interest. By
loaning the funds, the attorney either explicitly or constructively obtains an interest in the litigation recovery. If the attorney makes repayment of the loans contingent on the outcome of the litigation, then he
essentially acquires an explicit interest in the subject matter of the suit.
Even if the attorney makes repayment of the loan mandatory without
regard to the outcome of the action, however, he still constructively
obtains an interest. Loans for living expenses will logically be made to
indigent clients or those otherwise unable to support themselves. Given
that presumption, it is deemed highly unlikely that the client will be
able to repay such loans absent a recovery in the litigation. Applying
substance over form, the attorney constructively acquires an interest in
the litigation.
The second step in the logic of this rationale is that by acquiring
this interest in the litigation, the attorney's interests may be at odds
with his client's and thus, could affect his ability to competently represent his client. Because the attorney would be concerned with securing repayment of the loan, he will be unable to exercise his professional
judgment in the best interests of his client. Rather than providing objective and independent counsel, the attorney may subordinate the client's interest to his own. 7 Further, the client's own decision-making
78
abilities might also be affected by the existence of the loan.
The main problem with the entire conflict of interest rationale is
that it is founded on two assumptions which are not necessarily accurate. First, the reasoning employed presupposes that repayment of the
loan is fully dependent on recovery in the lawsuit. Often, however, this
is not the case. A client's inability to financially support himself can
very well be a temporary condition, perhaps as the result of an injury
work, it is
preventing work at that time. Once the client returns 7to
9
loan.
the
repay
to
able
be
quite foreseeable that he will

77. For an example of this situation, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
79. There may be some concern that an attorney would not be in a position to wait for
repayment, perhaps because of his own financial status or because he does not have an established
practice in the community. However, in those situations, the attorney can either choose not to
make a loan or guarantee a loan by another lender. Again, it is emphasized that the advantage
allowing loans would give to wealthier attorneys and firms is outweighed by the benefits it
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Second, the rationale assumes the attorney's interests will be contrary to those of his client. This too may be an invalid assumption."0
The primary concern is that, as a result of the conflicting interests, the
attorney will recommend that his client accept an inadequate settlement offer.8 1 Given that the primary motive behind all such loans is to
enable the client to resist inadequate settlements and to pursue his
cause of action,82 it is illogical to assume that the attorney would then
recommend his client accept such an offer. Furthermore, it is highly
unlikely that an attorney would offer to advance funds for living expenses unless he reasonably believed that his client's claim was winnable and that recovery of such investments in the litigation was substantially certain. Only in the rare situation where the client wishes to
spurn a substantial settlement offer to proceed to a trial with no guaranteed outcome does this scenario change. Therefore, the likelihood of
an attorney being in a situation where he would prefer a settlement
offer more than his client is highly improbable.8 "
A secondary problem with the conflict of interest rationale is its
inconsistency with the permissibility of contingent fee contracts.84 The
risks of investment loss which comprise the attorney's conflict of interest in a loan-making situation are not substantively different from those
in a permissible contingent fee contract. 5 In either situation, the poten-

provides.
80. Note, supra note 32, at 1105 ("The [Model] Code's treatment of contingent fees .
demonstrates that a substantial investment in a client's cause of action does not support a presumption that the attorney has acquired an interest in the litigation that creates an impermissible
conflict of interest").
81. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
82.
If an impoverished person is unable to secure subsistence from some source during disability, he may be deprived of the only effective means by which he can wait out the necessary
delays that result from litigation to enforce his cause of action. He may, for reasons of
economic necessity and physical need, be forced to settle his claim for an inadequate
amount.
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 446 (La. 1976).
83. Although it is possible to have such a situation arise, as depicted in the example at
supra note 47, it is not likely given the motive for making the loan and the attorney's experienced
judgment in such matters.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85. Compare supra note 47 with Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 467 n.182 which provides:
consider a situation in which (1) an attorney is relatively certain that the client will recover
$100,000 at trial, 30% of which ($30,000) the client would pay to the lawyer as the set
percentage fee; (2) the attorney already has expended $20,000 (for purposes of simplicity,
composed of amounts paid to investigators, paralegals, and associate attorneys); (3) bringing the case to trial will require expenditure of an additional $10,000; and (4) the client
receives a settlement offer of $80,000, 30% of which ($24,000) would go to the lawyer.
The lawyer presumably would prefer settlement, which would reward him or her with
$24,000 on a $20,000 investment, rather than trial, as a result of which the lawyer would
break even. The client, however, will net only $56,000 from the settlement, compared to
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tial for a conflict of interest is the same and the arguments for allowing
both are likewise identical."6 Furthermore, the concerns regarding the
impact on both the attorney's and the client's decision-making
processes would be the same. As stated in the rationale behind Minnesota's modification of the prohibition against subsistence loans, the dis-

tinction which permits contingent fee contracts yet forbids subsistence
loans is an arbitrary one.87
It is acknowledged that unusual situations may arise where attorney loan-making could result in conflicting interests. Those situations,
however, can be eliminated with precautions less drastic than an absolute bar of loans. As it stands, the prophylactic rule against subsistence
loans is unnecessarily broad. Its goal of preventing the negative side

effects of a conflict of interest can be achieved by establishing a series
of regulations governing the making of such loans. First, the attorney
must be required to inform his client of the potential conflict of interest
which could result from the loan.8 8 This is a standard preventative

measure for any conflict of interest situation.89 Second, the client must

remain liable for repayment of the loan regardless of the outcome of

$70,000 from prevailing at trial.
86. In both situations, the motivation behind the practice is to enable a client to pursue a
meritorious claim which he could not otherwise afford to prosecute.
87. Note, supra note 32 at 1092. There is a concern that the compounded interest of both
offering a contingent fee contract and making subsistence loans could result in an even greater
conflict of interest situation. This shouldbe a concern the attorney weighs prior to offering a loan.
By making the loan repayable, regardless of the outcome, this concern is lessened. It is a false
assumption that a client necessarily can never repay a loan just because he lacks the present funds
to do so. In fact, the sole purpose of all loans is to provide a borrower with needed funds at a time
when he does not have them. If loans were only to be granted in a situation where the borrower
had sufficient funds immediately on hand to repay the loan, it is unlikely that loans would ever be
needed, much less made.
88. Although informing the client may not have a significant impact on preventing possible
conflict of interest situations by itself, it can greatly limit the concerns when taken in conjunction
with the other preventative measures suggested by this comment. Furthermore, it is considered a
sufficient precaution in other conflict of interest situations.
89. An attorney is not absolutely forbidden to represent client in a cause in which he possesses a conflicting interest. "Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of the client
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests." MODEL CODE, DR 5-101(A). Conflicting interests may take many forms, such as a conflict
because the client is a relative of the attorney or the client has an interest adverse to that of
another client of the attorney. In such situations, the attorney is simply required to make a full
disclosure to the client of the conflicting interest and all the possible ramifications regarding his
representation. MODEL CODE, DR 5-105(C). The Model Rules require the additional precaution
that when a lawyer's other interests are involved, not only must the client consent after consultation but also the representation must reasonably appear not to be adversely affected by those
interests. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7. Upon disclosure, the client may make an informed decision as
to whether or not to employ the attorney. Nonetheless, an attorney is cautioned against placing
himself in these situations.
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the litigation. Thus, the attorney could be as indifferent to the outcome of the litigation as if the loan were never made. These two simple
preconditions to attorney loan-making would minimize the potential for
a conflict of interest dispute.
In order to ensure compliance with these regulations, there should
be a standard loan form which must be filed with the ABA before such
loans are made. 91 Each form would contain a provision at the top, in
bold print, which would caution the parties of the potential conflict of
interest. The loan procedure would require the attorney to make full
disclosure regarding such possibility to the client prior to signing. The
attorney and client's signatures on the document would signify that the
parties have read the warning and that the attorney made the required
disclosure.
2. Solicitation (Canons 27 and 29)
The second major rationale behind the prohibition against attorneys providing subsistence loans to their clients is that publication of
such loan-making practices constitutes an improper form of solicitation.
Less scrupulous attorneys might deliberately use offers of loans to attract clients. This practice would give the wealthier firms and attorneys
a significant advantage. Under Canon 27, an attorney is expressly prohibited from using any means which would induce a potential client to
employ him over another attorney. 2 This broad prohibition is based on
the potential that solicitation activities may demean the integrity and
90. An attorney would take into account the client's ability to eventually repay before offering a loan, and it is a false assumption that a client will never be capable of repaying strictly
because he lacks the current funds to do so.
91. For the financial implications of such a filing requirement, see infra notes 113-115 and
accompanying text.
92. A lawyer is allowed to disseminate certain information which could arguably induce a
client to employ one attorney or firm over another. However, the form and content of the dissemination are strictly regulated. MODEL CODE, DR 2-101(B) (limiting the dissemination to "dignified"
media forms "in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides"). Disciplinary Rule 2-101
further provides a detailed list of the permissible content of the publications including such items
as the names and addresses of bank references, accepted credit cards or other credit arrangements, contingent fee arrangements, and other acceptable compensation forms. Id. "A lawyer
shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend employment as a private practitioner,
of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Model Code, DR 2-103(A) (footnotes omitted).
Model Rules 7.1 through 7.3 provide similar restrictions although not providing as explicit a
list of permissible publications. MODEL RULES, Rules 7.1-7.3.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules emphasize that the sole purpose of allowing such
advertising is not to seek out clientele for the lawyers, but rather to inform the public about the
availability of legal services. See MODEL CODE, EC 2-1, 2-2, 2-7, 2-8; MODEL RULES, Comment
to Rule 7.2.
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94
honor of the profession,9 3 give the appearance of impropriety, encourage intrusions on the privacy of potential clients through "ambulance chasing, ' 95 and present situations where an attorney might use
96
his superior knowledge to unduly influence his client.
These rationales do not support prohibiting genuine subsistence
loans. Although it is true that a client may choose one attorney over
another based on the availability of such loans, this effect is not one of
the core evils which the broad rule against solicitation seeks to prevent. 91 Any influence on choice is really an incidental evil.
Another criticism of an attorney providing financial assistance to
enable a client to pursue his rightful cause of action is that such assistance demeans the honor of the profession. Canon 2 of the Model Code
specifically directs attorneys to "assist the legal profession in fulfilling
98
its duty to make legal counsel available." Consequently, an attorney,
providing what may be the only means a client has of being able to
pursue his claim,99 actually serves to meet one of the attorney's ethical
responsibilities as a member of the legal profession.
Previously, Canon 2 was used to justify pro bono work. The same
reasoning which led to the acceptance and encouragement of pro bono
work under Canon 2100 also applies to attorney loan-making. Those unable to pay for legal services still have a definite need for such services.101 The responsibility for fulfilling that need "rests upon the indi-

93. See Gabaldon, supra note 40, at 453.
94. Id. at 452-53.
95. It is a common concern that if solicitation activities were allowed, an aggressive feeseeking attorney might participate in behavior often referred to as ambulance chasing.
The bar argues that if ethical regulations permitted solicitation, lawyers would perch at the
bedsides of accident victims, linger outside the doors of quarrelling couples, and engage in
similar behavior in a variety of contexts. Not only would the process of identifying potential clients offend the sense of privacy of those being scrutinized, the appearance of a lawyer at a time of stress could disrupt private attempts at problem resolution.
Id. at 452-53.
96. Id. at 453 ("Some commentators have suggested that attorneys engaged in solicitation
also are likely to mislead the individuals solicited.").
97. Also, the standardization of loan terms throughout the industry will limit the prospect
of "attorney shopping" based on interest rates or payment terms. The remaining attraction will be
based solely on whether an attorney will provide a loan. This advantage is no greater than that
achieved by attorneys advertising the availability of contingent fee contracts and other credit ar-

rangements. Since attorneys are allowed to set their own contingent fee percentages, there is even
less of an opportunity for an attorney to gain an advantage with standardized loan-making.
98. MODEL CODE. Canon 2.
99. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 444-47 (La. 1976).
100. MODEL CODE, EC 2-25.
101. Id. Ethical Consideration 2-25 states:
Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees has been met
in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court appointments on behalf of
such individuals. The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to
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vidual lawyer." ' 2 Often, the only way an indigent client can assert his
legal rights is if an attorney voluntarily fills that need through a personal investment of his time and work. Similarly, another way a client
is financially prevented from pursuing his legal rights is if he lacks the
funds necessary to subsist during the litigation. Like pro bono service,
the attorney can fill that need by providing or guaranteeing a loan to
the client.
In addition to Canon 2, Canon 8 of the Model Code provides that
"a lawyer should assist in improving the legal system." ' The Ethical
Considerations which accompany Canon 8 further elaborate that the
legal system should serve to encourage the "use of legal remedies to
achieve redress of grievances." 1'0 Moreover, they advise that "lawyers
are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and
to initiate corrective measures therein.' 05 A current*deficiency in the
system is that a client with a meritorious claim may be unable to pursue that claim due to a temporary state of financial hardship induced
by the very incident giving rise to his cause of action."0 6 An attorney
providing the funds necessary for such a client to pursue his claim
would both encourage the use of the legal system and rectify a deficiency in the present legal framework.
The second evil of solicitation, the appearance of impropriety, is
also an inadequate justification for prohibiting subsistence loans by attorneys. There is a minor risk that public knowledge of attorney loanmaking to clients would appear improper. However, a subsistence loan
may be the only means by which a client would be able to prosecute his
rightful cause of action. The risk of improprieties is far outweighed by
the benefit the loans would provide by enabling such individuals access
the judicial system.
The third justification, that permitting solicitation activities could
result in unscrupulous client-baiting behavior, is inapplicable. Allowing
attorneys to make subsistence loans to needy clients could not possibly
be asserted as a proximate cause of attorneys badgering accident vic07
tims or invading the privacy of potential clients.1
The fourth justification is equally inapplicable for reasons similar
to those discussed in reference to the conflict of interest rationale. Al-

pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer . ...
102. Id.
103. MODEL CODE, Canon 8.
104. MODEL CODE, EC 8-1. "This system should function in a manner that commands public respect and fosters the use of the legal remedies to achieve redress of grievances." Id.
105. Id.
106. See e.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 444-47 (La. 1976).
107. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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lowing an attorney to loan a client money for living expenses is no more
likely to present a situation where an attorney would mislead a client
than in allowing contingent fee contracts. An attorney aggressively
seeking fees would be just as inclined to mislead a client regarding the
probability of prevailing and fair contingent fee terms as he would be
to mislead a client regarding loan terms. Furthermore, any concerns
regarding misleading terms can be eliminated by using standardized
loan agreements which establish mandatory nation-wide terms for interest and repayment. With such limitations, allowing attorneys to provide subsistence loans will have even less of an impact on this evil of
solicitation than the currently permissible contingent fee contracts.
However, it still may be desirable to lessen the solicitation risks of
such loan-making. Without some limitation on. solicitation, unscrupulous attorneys might take advantage of the loans to actually bribe clients. This potential would give substantial advantages to the wealthier
members of the bar.
As with preventing conflict of interest concerns, a few simple regulations would remove the negative solicitation aspects of allowing attorneys to make subsistence loans to their clients.108 First, an attorney
could not intentionally publicize his willingness to make loans. 109 Second, an attorney could not offer to make such loans to clients contacted
by the attorney or otherwise use loans to induce employment. 110 Third,
the amount of the loan is to be limited to that which is absolutely necessary in order to subsist during the litigation process.11 Subsistence
should be determined by necessity and not include unnecessary luxury
or convenience items based on a person's customary standard of living.
The purpose of allowing such loans is only to enable those to pursue
their interests who otherwise could not afford to wait out the litigation.

108. Standardization of the terms would also prevent "attorney-shopping" by potential clients which could otherwise cause a conflicting interest in their attorney-selection decision-making
process.
109. Strelow, supra note 14, at 1448 ("The prohibition against advertising and solicitation
in Canon 27 concerns the affirmative steps taken by an attorney to advertise his services or to
augment the normal publicity which results from his accomplishments.").
110. Enforcement of this particular condition would prove extremely difficult. However, if it
is not prohibited by the statute, attorneys would no doubt attempt it far more often. When taken
in conjunction with the other regulations, it should serve as an adequate deterrent.
11l. One Commentator has suggested that:
[a] prohibition against attorneys lending money in an amount which materially exceeds
their good faith estimate of a client's subsistence needs would discourage the use of loan
offers in soliciting employment but would not frustrate legitimate lending. Such a limitation would be a desirable exception to a broad rule allowing noninducement loans to enable
clients to pursue their claims. The exception would invalidate loans which are excessive but
which cannot otherwise be shown to have been offered as inducements.
Id. at 1433.
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This amount can include necessary medical expenses, minimal living
expenses, and all other expenses necessary to prevent a client from being unable to pursue his claim due to economic necessity or physical
need. Fourth, the client must first make reasonable attempts to secure
funds from another source independent of the attorney." 2 Finally, all
such loans, or guarantees of loans made by another lender, must be
formally registered with the ABA.
A standardized loan form would be required in order to legalize
the loan."' In addition to the provisions previously listed, the form
would also provide a section for declaring the amount necessary for the
client to subsist during the litigation. The signature on the form would
serve as an acknowledgement and assurance that the loan amounts advanced are limited to the extent necessary for subsistence. Filing with
the ABA would serve both as a check on the system and as a deterrent
to the "unscrupulous attorney." If any attorney appears to be making a
substantial number of loans as reflected by his filings, he may be requested to submit an explanation of his activities. If an attorney is
found to have violated any of these regulations, he will be subject to
disbarment or suspension proceedings." 4 In order to finance this new
filing procedure," 5 filing fees would be charged as well as penalty fees
for failure to comply with the filing regulations.
3.

Stirring Up Litigation (Canons 28 and 29)

The third most frequently advanced justification for the prohibition against an attorney providing financial support loans to his client is
that it could result in stirring up litigation. This rationale is closely
related to the previous justification based on solicitation. It is argued
that, by allowing attorneys to offer loans to their clients, aggressive fee-

112. See Note, supra note 32, at 1109.
Prohibiting an attorney from guaranteeing loans for living expenses until the client has
attempted to obtain an unguaranteed loan through ordinary commercial channels is one
way to ensure the client's necessity. If a client's loan application is rejected, the rejection
notice provides adequate assurance that the client's circumstances require the attorney's
guarantee.
Id.
113. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
114. Disbarment and suspension may seem to be severe penalties for such an infraction.
However, the importance of the goals which loan-making regulations seek to achieve and the
greater evils which they seek to prevent, demand a high price to insure compliance. None of the
regulations can achieve their preventative goals without the other regulations. Therefore, it is
necessary to enforce even the smallest of the requirements in order to succeed. Furthermore, the
current penalty for making living expense loans to a client is disbarment or suspension in the
states which prohibit loan-making. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
115. The initial concept of a filing system was inspired by another article concerning the
ethical repercussions of attorney loan-making. Note, supra note 32 at 1113.
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hungry attorneys might induce clients to bring suits which they otherwise would not have brought. Stirring up litigation has long been discouraged by the legal profession.1 e However, the historical basis for
this prohibition was to prevent the obstruction of the administration of
justice and the oppression of those with a legitimate interest in
litigation.'
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent oppression in the legal
system by the wealthy. This purpose will be frustrated if an impoverished client can be forced by means of financial hardship to accept the
inadequate settlement offer of a wealthier opponent who can afford to
wait out the delays of litigation. By contrast, if an attorney can advance that client the funds necessary to wait out the delays of litigation, the oppression is avoided and the route to obtaining justice is no
longer obstructed. Thus, by allowing attorneys to supply what may be a
client's only means of pursuing his claim, the exact purpose for which
the stirring up of litigation prohibition was created, will be served.
4.

Advancement of Expenses Expressly Limited (Canon 42)

The final justification for prohibiting attorney loans to clients was
suggested by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics in Formal
Opinion 288.118 The committee noted that Canon 42 permits a lawyer
to advance expenses as a matter of convenience if done in good faith
and subject to reimbursement from the client." 9 However, the committee explicitly held that these permissible expenses referred only to the
expenses of litigation, and did not encompass subsistence advances to a
client while the case is pending. 2 0 Given the ambiguous language of
the canon, it could equally be determined that advances of all expenses
(living or otherwise) are permissible as long as the advances are made
in good faith and subject to reimbursement. Therefore, absent some
reasoning or explanation for its holding, the view of the committee is
not very persuasive in establishing Canon 42 as an appropriate ground
for the prohibition against attorney loans.
B. Analysis of the Modifications Made by Five States
As previously noted, five states were also unimpressed with the jus-

116. For a discussion of the common law crimes of barratry, champerty, and maintenance,
see supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
117. Supra notes 20, 29-30 and accompanying text.
118. Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J. at 33.
119. Id. Canon 42 states:
"[a] lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience." MODEL
CODE,

Canon 42.

120.

See Opinion 288, supra note 13, 41 A.B.A. J.at 33.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/9

1990]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT

FINANCING PROHIBITIONS

tifications behind the prohibition and modified the rule to allow attorneys to make loans under certain preconditions. 12 These states comprehended the necessity for allowing such loans,1 22 yet also understood the
need for some restrictions in order to prevent abuse of the practice.1 23
The methods chosen by all five states are virtually identical.1 24 First,
the states mandate that the client remain ultimately liable for repayment of the loan regardless of the outcome of the litigation. 2 5 Second,
loans can not be made as an inducement to obtain employment. 26
Third, the making of loan offers prior to the client contacting the attorney are prohibited. 12 Finally, Louisiana, Minnesota and Texas limit
the advances to living expenses of the client. 28
These states' efforts at preventing the negative side effects of attorney loan-making practices are commendable; but their effectiveness is
lost because of the lack of realistic means of enforcement. Without requiring filing or recording of the loan and a standardized loan agreement, it would be very difficult to prevent attorneys from making loans
without the mandatory repayment provisions. It would be even harder
to prove the use of the loan as an inducement or the timing of the loan
offer. 12 9 However, by use of a filing system, the frequency with which
the attorney makes loans would serve as a "red flag" on which the
ABA could follow up. By limiting the amount of the loan to subsistence
needs and requiring submission to the ABA of proof of need, the filing
process would deter use of loans as an inducement. Finally, requiring
the client to first seek financial aid elsewhere and bear proof of the
failure of such attempts would eliminate any remaining possibility that
loan offers would be used as inducements. It would also serve as proof
of the client's genuine need, thus removing the risk that such loans
would be used fraudulently as bribes.
One other flaw exists with regard to the precautions adopted by
these five states. The states fail to fully address the conflict of interest
concerns involved in loan-making practices. Although these states man-

121. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. There was some variation in language, but the basic requirements were the same. See
supra notes 71-73.
125. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
127. Implicitly within the "prior offer context" or explicitly, all five states prohibited the
attorney from advertising such practice because it had the same prejudicial effect as making an
offer prior to employment. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. The prohibition against making the offer prior to employment is really just another
means of preventing the use of loan offers as an inducement to employment.
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date the client have ultimate liability for repayment of the loans, no
further steps are taken to insure that the client is made aware of the
potential for a conflict of interest with his attorney. A simple solution
to such concerns would be to require full disclosure prior to the loan
agreement. Again, enforcement would be obtained by incorporating a
disclosure provision into the standardized loan agreement that would
have to be filed with the ABA. 13 0
The prohibition against attorneys making living expense loans to
their clients is both unnecessary and undesirable. By means of a few
simple regulations,"'1 the reasons for which such loans are proscribed
could be removed. These five states correctly chose to modify the rule
and have provided a good foundation for regulating the loan-making
process. With the addition of certain enforcement regulations, the modifications made in these states serve as both a model and an inspiration
to the remaining forty-five states.132
C. Proposed Legislation to Replace the Current Law
Legislation" 3 based on the following approach should be considered as a model for modifying the current prohibition.
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer may:
(1) advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and
costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses; and
(2) advance or guarantee the personal and living expenses of a client
which are necessary for the client to subsist during the litigation, provided that the following preconditions to the loan or guarantee are met;
(a) the amount of the loan or guarantee is strictly limited to the
amounts necessary for the client, including his spouse and dependents,
to subsist; and
(b) the loan or guarantee or an offer therefore is not used as an inducement by the attorney, or anyone on his behalf, for obtaining employ-

130. Enforcement of the filing requirements would be obtained by allowing a violation to
serve as grounds for malpractice litigation and disbarment or suspension proceedings. See supra
note 114 and accompanying text. The costs of establishing and maintaining such a filing system
would be obtained by way of filing fees and penalty fees for failure to comply. See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
131. No single regulation can solve the problems involved in attorney loan-making
practices. It is the combination of all the regulations taken together which will eliminate potential
,abuses.
132. In re Arensberg, 159 A.D. 797, 553 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1990).
133. The legislative proposal suggested here is based on the form and text used in DR 5-

103(B).

MODEL CODE,

DR 5-103(B).
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ment; and
(c) the attorney, or anyone on his behalf, has not offered to make such
loans or guarantees prior to the attorney, or his agent, being approached by the client; and
(d) the attorney has not intentionally encouraged. public knowledge or
otherwise advertised his willingness to make or his practice of making
personal loans; and
(e) the client has made good faith, reasonable attempts to obtain financial aid from other commercial sources without involving the attorney
and bears proof that such attempts were unsuccessful; and
(f) the client will remain ultimately liable for repayment of all funds
advanced regardless of the outcome of the litigation; and
(g) the attorney has made full disclosure to the client of the potential
for a conflict of interest arising as a result of the loan and the possible
ramifications this conflict could have; and
(h) all parties to the loan or guarantee agreement have completed the
ABA standardized loan agreement and filed accordingly with the appropriate ABA authority.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The prohibition against attorneys making living expense loans to
their clients is both undesirable and unnecessary. Often a client is unable to prosecute his rightful claim because of financial hardship or
physical need. This situation denies an otherwise deserving individual
of his right to access the judicial system. It also gives wealthier litigants a significant advantage with regard to their litigation and settlement bargaining positions. If an attorney is permitted to make or guarantee loans which would enable the client to subsist during the
litigation, this gross obstruction to justice is removed. Hence, removing
the prohibition against these loans or guarantees is a desirable result.
Furthermore, the reasons for which the proscription exists could
easily be served by the establishment of regulations which would govern the loan-making activities. The five states which chose to modify
the rule were right in doing so. They have further provided a good
foundation for showing that regulating the loan-making process can effectively replace the over-broad prohibition and serve the same preventative goals. With the addition of certain enforcement regulations as
suggested by this comment, the modifications made in these states
should serve as both a model and an inspiration to the remaining fortyfive states.
Dawn S. Garrett
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